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REPLY BRIEF TO 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
I. APPELLANT HAS REASONS SUPPORTING THE ISSUANCE OF THIS WRIT. 
In its Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, Appellee Graham complains that Petitioner, in its 
initial brief, did not refer the Court to any "special and 
important" reasons for the issuance of Writ of Certiorari as 
required by Rules 46 and 49 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. However, the Appellee is not accurate. 
Rule 46(d) allowa the Court to consider cases, including: 
. . . when the Court of Appeals has decided an 
important question of municipal, state, or 
federal law which has not been, but should be 
settled by the Supreme Court." 
Throughout Appellant's brief, it was argued that a need 
exists to interpret Utah's Dram Shop law as prohibiting the 
providing of alcoholic beverages to intoxicated persons, not only 
at places of sale, but also when the social host is involved. 
Further, Appellant argues that this conclusion can be drawn from 
a review of legislative history (Appellant's brief, pp. 5-6), 
from Utah's Dram Shop Act itself (Id., pp. 6-8), and as .necessary 
protection for the citizens of Utah. (Id. at pp. 11-13). These 
referenced sections demonstrate that Appellant clearly has 
pleaded an important question of state law which needs 
examination by the Supreme Court and thus satisfies the 
requirements of Rules 46 and 49(a), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
II. THE CASE LAW OF JURISDICTIONS CITED BY APPELLEE 
ARE NOT DISPOSITIVE CONCERNING INTERPRETING 
UTAH'S DRAM SHOP ACT. 
At page 10 of its brief, Appellee argues that a number of 
other jurisdictions have statutes similar to Utah's Dram Shop 
Act, but which have no application to the social host situation. 
However, a close analysis of those cases and the statutes behind 
them proves otherwise. 
For example, although Appellee cites Fabian v. Polish 
American Veterans, 466 NE 2d 1239 (111. App. 1984), it is clear 
from a reading of that case and the Illinois Liquor Control Act, 
(§6-21, Illinois Code, 1986), that the statute makes three groups 
of defendants liable for injuries sustained by someone as the 
result of furnishing liquor to an intoxicated person, including: 
(1) Licensees; (2) hotel\motel room renters who know the room 
will be used by persons under 21 years of age for the consumption 
of alcohol; and (3) owners/renters of premises where alcoholic 
liquors will be sold. A complete copy of Illinois1 statute 
(along with other state's statutes referenced subsequently) 
appears in the appendix of this brief. The Illinois statute 
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differs substantially from Utah's Dram Shop Act, and Illinois 
case law has little relevance in interpreting the Utah Act. 
Further, Missouri case law is not dispositive on the Utah 
Act. To begin with, Missouri's Dram Shop Act was repealed in 
1934 (Laws of 1933-34, Extra Session, p. 77). Under Missouri 
Revised Statutes 537.053(1), Missouri, following the common law, 
primarily looks to the consumption of alcoholic beverages, rather 
than the furnishing of alcoholic beverages in its proximate cause 
analysis concerning "injuries inflicted upon another by an 
intoxicated person." In addition, under §537.053(3), R.S.Mo., 
liability is found specifically against those previously 
convicted of selling liquor to an obviously intoxicated person. 
Clearly, Missouri's statute is different in nature from Utah's. 
Appellee also cites the Alabama case of Smoyer v. Birmingham 
Area Chamber of Commerce, 517 S.2d 585 (Ala. 1987) as standing 
for Alabama's refusal to find social host liability. Smoyer was 
a limited case holding only that the hotel manager and an 
association hosting a drinking function at a hotel could not be 
found liable for injuries sustained when one of the volunteers 
at this function subsequently injured a third party with his 
automobile. The court found that no "sale" of liquor had 
occurred on the defendant's part, a "sale" being one of the two 
requisites under its Illegal Liquor Sales Act (§6-5-7(1), Alabama 
Code). 
Alabama case law clearly demonstrates that liability may 
exist for the social host where there has been a providing of 
3 
alcoholic beverages contrary to law. In Martin v. Watts, 513 S. 
2d 958 (Ala. 1987), the Supreme Court of Alabama found no 
limitation of its Dram Shop Act to a commercial dispenser when 
it stated: 
Had the legislature intended to limit the 
class of persons against whom an action could 
be brought, the draftsman could certainly have 
employed words much better suited to an 
expression of such an intent. If it was the 
intention to create a right of action against 
only that narrowly defined class of persons, 
i.e. "commercial dispensers", the draftsman 
could have incorporated that term into the 
act. Or, they could have stopped with the 
words "by selling". They did not do that. 
Instead, they included the terms "giving" and 
"otherwise disposing of". It is hard to 
imagine a phrase more expansive than 
"otherwise disposing of". 
Id. at p. 961. The court went on to find support for social host 
liability by looking back to its former 1909 Act which implied 
the same. Additionally, the Alabama Supreme Court made it very 
clear that the name of its Dram Shop Act, "Illegal Liquor Sales 
Act", was not dispositive of who the Act pertained to. See also: 
Liao v. Harry's Bar, 574 S.2d 775 (Ala. 1990). (Alabama Supreme 
Court considered the liability of wedding reception hosts who 
dispensed champagne which eventually resulted in an automobile 
accident involving one of the intoxicated guests. Hosts were 
held not liable because they had not actually purchased the 
champagne, nor were hosts ever aware that the defendant guest had 
become so intoxicated that he was unable to operate his 
automobile. Further, the host committed no act contrary to law, 
including the providing of alcohol to a minor). 
4 
Finally, the Washington case of Burkhart v. Harrod, 755 P.2d 
759 (Wash. 1988), cited by the Appellee, in its public policy 
discussion is not dispositive in this case. The Washington 
Supreme Court in Burkhart was concerned that it was being asked 
to find social host liability in the face of the failure of its 
legislature to enact the same. Since Washington repealed its own 
Dram Shop Act in 1955, and has since followed only the common law 
in that area, the court reasoned: 
For all these reasons, we decline to extend 
common law liability to social hosts. This is 
not to say, however, that social host 
liability is necessarily an inappropriate 
reaction to the problem of drunk driving. 
Rather, we hold only that the judiciary is 
ill-equipped to impose such a remedy. 
Id. at p. 762. Since the legislature in Utah has acted to 
provide a Dram Shop Act with social host liability, Burkhart is 
unpersuasive. 
The fact remains that a number of states have taken the stand 
that their Dram Shop Acts must be interpreted as including social 
host liability, and that under the language of Utah's Dram Shop 
Act, supported by sound public policy reasoning, this Court is 
also asked to rightly interpret Utah's Act as including the 
social host and thus fully and adequately protect the citizens 
of this state. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J& day of «*Wh, 1992. 
fox^i 
ERIK M. WARD CHR 
Attorneys for Appe/lant 
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quor by a minor, there must be a showing holic liquor, had possession of beer bottle 
the defendant had immediate and exclusive beyond a reasonable doubt, nor did it over-
control of area where items were located. come testimony of occupants that defendant 
Id. at no time had possession of bottle. People 
Control, in prosecution charging posses- v- Monroe, 1975, 31 Ill.App.3d i l l , 333 
sion of alcoholic liquor by a minor, may be N.E.2d 239. 
"exclusive'* even if possession is shown to 
be joint. Id. ** Sentence and punishment 
Where hearing in aggravation and mitiga-
4. Evidence
 t j o n &„ p ^ 0f guilty fully covered facts 
Evidence, including testimony of police leading up to defendant's arrest, sentence of 
officer that, upon stopping vehicle after ob- 30 days on each of 5 misdemeanor offenses, 
serving a "wired on" license plate, he saw a including theft, accepting liquor as a minor, 
partially full bottle of beer lying on floor reckless driving, transportation of an open 
between right front door and front seat and liquor container, and fleeing or attempting 
that defendant had been seated in front seat to elude a police officer, to be served con-
on right side, was insufficient to support a currently was not inappropriate. People v. 
finding that defendant, charged with being a Richardson, 1969, 43 I11.2d 318, 253 N.E.2d 
person under 19 years in possession of alco- 420. 
135. Actions for damages caused by intoxication—Lessor's liability— 
Forfeiture of lease—Maximum recovery—Limitations—Juris-
diction—Service 
§ 6-21. (a) Every person who is injured within this State, in person 
or property, by any intoxicated person has a right ofertion in his or her 
own name, severally or jointly, against any person, licensed under the 
laws of this State or of any other state to sell alcoholic liquor, who, by 
selling or giving alcoholic liquor, within or without the territorial limits 
of this State, causes the intoxication of such person. Any person at least 
21 years of age who pays for a hotel or motel room or facility knowing 
that the room or facility is to be used by any person under 21 years of 
age for the unlawful consumption of alcoholic liquors and such consump-
tion causes the intoxication of the person under 21 years of age, shall be 
liable to any person who is injured in person or property by the 
intoxicated person under 21 years of age. Any person owning, renting, 
leasing or permitting the occupation of any building or premises with 
knowledge that alcoholic liquors are to be sold therein, or who having 
leased the same for oilier purposes, shall knowingly permit therein the 
sale of any alcoholic liquors that have caused the intoxication of any 
person, shall be liable, severally or jointly, with the person selling or 
giving the liquors. However, if such building or premises belong to a 
minor or other person under guardianship the guardian of such person 
shall be held liable instead of the ward. A married woman has the same 
right to bring the action and to control it and the amount recovered as an 
unmarried woman. All damages recovered by a minor under this Act 
shall be paid either to the minor, or to his or her parent, guardian or next 
friend as the court shall direct. The unlawful sale or gift of alcoholic 
liquor works a forfeiture of all rights of the lessee or tenant under any 
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lease or contract of rent upon the premises where the unlawful sale or gift 
takes place. All actions for damages under this Act may be by any 
appropriate action in the circuit court. An action shall lie for injuries to 
means of support caused by an intoxicated person or in consequence of 
the intoxication of any person resulting as hereinabove set out. The 
action, if the person from whom support was furnished is living, shall be 
brought by any person injured in means of support in his or her name for 
his or her benefit and the benefit of all other persons injured in means of 
support. However, any person claiming to be injured in means of 
support and not included in any action brought hereunder may join by 
motion made within the times herein provided for bringing such action or 
the personal representative of the deceased person from whom such 
support was furnished may so join. In every such action the jury shall 
determine the amount of damages to be recovered without regard to and 
with no special instructions as to the dollar limits on recovery imposed 
by this Section. The amount recovered in every such action is for the 
exclusive benefit of the person injured in loss of support and shall be 
distributed to such persons in the proportions determined by the verdict 
rendered or judgment entered in the action. If the right of action is 
settled by agreement with the personal representative of a deceased 
person from whom support was furnished, the court having jurisdiction 
of the estate of the deceased person shall distribute the amount of the 
settlement to the person injured in loss of support in the proportion, as 
determined by the court, that the percentage of dependency of each such 
" person upon the deceased person bears to the sum of the percentages of 
dependency of all such persons upon the deceased person. For all causes 
of action involving persons injured, killed, or incurring property damage 
before the effective date of this amendatory Act of 1985, in no event shall 
the judgment or recovery under this Act for injury to the person or to the 
property of any person as hereinabove set out exceed $15,000, and 
recovery under this Act for loss of means of support resulting from the 
death or injury of any person, as hereinabove set out, shall not exceed 
$20,000. For all causes of action involving persons injured, killed, or 
incurring property damage after the effective date of this amendatory Act 
of 1985, in no event shall the judgment or recovery for injury to the 
person or property of any person exceed $30,000 for each person 
incurring damages, and recovery under this Act for loss of means of 
support resulting from the death or injury of any person shall not exceed 
$40,000. Nothing in this Section bars any person from making separate 
claims which, in the aggregate, exceed any one limit where such person 
incurs more than one type of compensable damage, including personal 
injury, property damage, and loss to means of support. However, all 
persons claiming loss to means of support shall be limited to an aggregate 
122 
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recovery not to exceed the single limitation set forth herein for the death 
or injury of each person from whom support is claimed. 
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to confer a cause of action for 
injuries to the person or property of the intoxicated person himself, nor 
shall anything in this Act be construed to confer a cause of action for loss 
of means of support on the intoxicated person himself or on any person 
claiming to be supported by such intoxicated person. In conformance 
with the rule of statutory construction enunciated in the general Illinois 
saving provision in Section 4 of "AN ACT to revise the law in relation to 
the construction of the statutes", approved March 5, 1874, as amended,1 
no amendment of this Section purporting to abolish or having the effect 
of abolishing a cause of action shall be applied to invalidate a cause of 
action accruing before its effective date, irrespective of whether the 
amendment was passed before or after the effective date of this Amend-
atory Act of 1986. 
Each action hereunder shall be barred unless commenced within one 
year next after the cause of action accrued. 
However, a licensed distributor or brewer whose only connection with 
the furnishing of alcoholic liquor which is alleged to have caused 
intoxication was the furnishing or maintaining of any apparatus for the 
dispensing or cooling of beer is not liable under this Section, and if such 
licensee is named as a defendant, a proper motion to dismiss shall be 
granted. 
(b) Any person licensed under any state or local law to sell alcoholic 
liquor, whether or not a citizen or resident of this State, who in person or 
through an agent causes the intoxication, by the sale or gift of alcoholic 
liquor, of any person who, while intoxicated, causes injury to any person 
or property in the State of Illinois thereby submits such licensed person, 
and, if an individual, his or her personal representative, to the jurisdiction 
of the courts of this State for a cause of action arising under subsection 
(a) above. 
Service of process upon any person who is subject to the jurisdiction of 
the courts of this State^ as provided in this subsection, may be made by 
personally serving the summons upon the defendant outside this State, as 
provided in the Code of Civil Procedure, as now or hereafter amended,2 
with the same force and effect as though summons had been personally 
served within this State. 
Only causes of action arising under subsection (a) above may be 
asserted against a defendant in an action in which jurisdiction over him 
or her is based upon this subsection. 
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Nothing herein contained limits or affects the right to serve any 
process in any other manner now or hereafter provided by law. 
Laws 1933-34, 2nd Sp.Sess., p. 57, art. VI, § 14, eff. Jan. 31, 1934. Amended by 
Laws 1949, p. 816, § 1, eff. Aug. 10, 1949; Laws 1955, p. 1961, § 1, eff. July 14, 
1955; Laws 1959, p. 597, § 1, eff. July 8, 1959; Laws 1959, p. 1075, § 1, eff. 
July 15, 1959; Laws 1963, p. 3324, § 1, eff. Aug. 23, 1963; Laws 1965, p. 2217, 
§ 1, eff. Aug. 2, 1965; Laws 1967, p. 2701, § 1, eff. Aug. 7, 1967; P.A. 77-1186, 
§ 1, eff. Aug. 19, 1971; P.A. 79-1360, § 35, eff. Oct. 1, 1976. Renumbered 
§ 6-21 and amended by P.A. 82-783, Art. VI, § 2, eff. July 13, 1982. Amended 
by P.A. 83-706, § 27, eff. Sept. 23, 1983; P.A. 84-271, § 1, eff. Sept. 12, 1985; 
P.A. 84-634, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1986; P.A. 84-1308, Art. II, § 66, eff. Aug. 25, 
1986; P.A. 84-1380, § 1, eff. Sept. 12, 1986; P.A. 84-1381, § 1, eff. Sept. 12, 
1986. 
1
 Chapter 1, H 1103. 
2
 Chapter 110, H 1-101 et seq. 
Historical Note 
This paragraph is a substantial re-enact-
ment of R.S. 1874, p. 438, § 9. 
As originally enacted the paragraph read: 
"Every husband, wife, child, parent, 
guardian, employer or other person, who 
shall be injured, in person or property, or 
means of support, by any intoxicated per-
son, or in consequence of the intoxication, 
habitual or otherwise, of any person, shall 
have a right of action in his or her own 
name, severally or jointly, against any per-
son or persons who shall, by selling or 
giving alcoholic liquor, have caused the in-
toxication, in whole or in part, of such 
person; and any person owning, renting, 
leasing or permitting the occupation of any 
building or premises, and having knowledge 
that alcoholic liquors are to be sold therein, 
or who having leased the same for other 
purposes, shall knowingly permit therein 
the sale of any alcoholic liquors that have 
caused, in whole or in part, the intoxication 
of any person, shall be liable, severally or 
jointly, with the person or persons selling or 
giving alcoholic liquors aforesaid, for all 
damages sustained, and for exemplary dam-
ages; and a married woman shall have the 
same right to bring suit and to control the 
same and the amount recovered as a feme 
sole; and all damages recovered by a minor 
under this Act shall be paid either to such 
minor, or to his or her parent, guardian or 
next friend as the court shall direct; and 
the unlawful sale, or giving away, of alco-
holic liquor, shall work a forfeiture of all 
rights of the lessee or tenant, under any 
lease or contract of rent upon the premises 
where such unlawful sale or giving away 
shall take place; and all suits for damages 
under this Act may be by any appropriate 
action in any of the courts of this State 
having competent jurisdiction." 
The 1949 amendment substituted "as 
hereinafter provided" for "for all damages 
sustained, and for exemplary damages"; 
added the provisions relating to maximum 
recovery allowed and a two year limitations 
period. 
The 1955 amendment rewrote the para-
graph to read: 
"Every person, who shall be injured, in 
person or property by any intoxicated per-
son, shall have a right of action in his or 
her own name, severally or jointly, against 
any person or persons who shall, by selling 
or giving alcoholic liquor, have caused the 
intoxication, in whole or in part, of such 
person; and any person owning, renting, 
leasing or permitting the occupation of any 
building or premises, and having knowledge 
that alcoholic liquors are to be sold therein, 
or who having leased the same for other 
purposes, shall knowingly permit therein 
the sale of any alcoholic liquors that have 
caused, in whole or in part, the intoxication 
of any person, shall be liable, severally or 
jointly, with the person or persons selling or 
giving liquors aforesaid, as hereinafter pro-
vided; and a married woman shall have the 
same right to bring suit and to control the 
same and the amount recovered as a feme 
sole; and all damages recovered by a minor 
under this Act shall be paid either to such 
minor, or to his or her parent, guardian or 
next friend as the court shall direct; and 
the unlawful sale, or giving away, of alco-
holic liquor, shall work a forfeiture of all 
rights of the lessee or tenant, under any 
124 
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involved in an accident, or in competitive sports, 
or other emergency at the scene of an accident, 
without first obtaining the consent of the parent 
or guardian of the minor, and shall not be liable 
for any civil damages other than damages occa-
sioned by gross negligence or by willful or wan-
ton acts or omissions by such person in render-
ing the emergency care. 
2. Any other person who has been trained to 
provide first aid in a standard recognized train-
ing program may, without compensation, render 
emergency care or assistance to the level for 
which he or she has been trained, at the scene of 
an emergency or accident, and shall not be lia-
ble for civil damages for acts or omissions other 
than damages occasioned by gross negligence or 
by willful or wanton acts or omissions by such 
person in rendering such emergency care. 
(L. 1979 H.B. 445 § 1, A.L. 1983 1st Ex. Scss. H.B. 8, A.L. 
1986 H.B. 860) 
537.040. Married woman alone liable for her 
torts.—For all civil injuries committed by a 
married woman, damages may be recovered 
against her alone, and her husband shall not be 
responsible therefor, except in cases where, 
under the law, he would be jointly responsible 
with her, if the marriage did not exist. 
(RSMo 1939 § 3680) 
Prior revisions: 1929 § 3290; 1919 § 4241 
(1986) The court abolished the doctrine of interspousai im-
munity as a bar to claims for intentional torts. Townsend v. 
Townsend (Mo. banc), 708 S.W.2d 646. 
(1986) The doctrine of spousal immunity is no longer availa-
ble as a bar to negligence actions. S.A.V. v. K.G.V. (Mo. 
t>ane), 708 S.W.2d 651. 
537.045. Parent or guardian liable for dam-
ages by minor—when—limitation—work ac-
cepted in lieu of payment—I. The parent or 
guardian, excluding foster parents, of any un-
emancipated minor, under eighteen years of 
age, in their care and custody, against whom 
judgment has been rendered for purposely 
marking upon, defacing or in any way damag-
ing any property, shall be liable for the payment 
of that judgment up to an amount not to exceed 
two thousand dollars, provided that the parent 
or guardian has been joined as a party defend-
ant in the original action. The judgment pro-
vided herein to be paid shall be paid to the 
owner of the property damaged, but such pay-
ment shall not be a bar to any criminal action 
or any proceeding against the unemancipated 
minor for such damage for the balance of the 
judgment not paid by the parent or guardian. 
2. The parent or guardian, excluding foster 
parents, of any unemancipated minor, under 
eighteen years of age, in their care and custody, 
against whom judgment has been rendered for 
purposely causing personal injury to any indi-
vidual, shall be liable for the payment for that 
judgment up to an amount not to exceed two 
thousand dollars, provided that the parent or 
guardian has been joined as a party defendant 
in the original action. The judgment provided 
herein to be paid shall be paid to the person in-
jured, but such payment shall not be a bar to 
any criminal action or any proceeding against 
the unemancipated minor for such damage for 
the balance of the judgment not paid by the 
parent or guardian. 
3. Upon rendering a judgment in any pro-
ceeding under this section, the judge may order 
the parent or guardian, or the minor who dam-
aged the property or caused the personal injury, 
to work for the owner of the property damaged 
or the person injured in lieu of payment, if the 
parent, minor and the owner of the property 
damaged or the person injured are agreeable. 
(L. 1965 p. 661 | 1, A.L. 1979 H.B. 207) 
537.050. Civil action not merged in criminal 
prosecution.—In no case shall the right of ac-
tion of any party injured by the commission of 
any felony or misdemeanor be deemed or ad-
judged to be merged in such felony or misde-
meanor; but he may recover the amount of 
damages sustained thereby in an action to be 
brought before any court or tribunal of compe-
tent jurisdiction. 
(RSMo 1939 § 3679) 
Prior revisions: 1929 § 3289; 1919 § 4240; 1909 § 5447 
537.053. Sale of alcoholic beverage not 
proximate cause of personal injuries or death— 
exceptions—requirements—(dram shop law).— 
1. Since the repeal of the Missouri Dram Shop 
Act in 1934 (Laws of 1933-34, extra session, 
page 77), it has been and continues to be the 
policy of this state to follow the common law of 
England, as declared in section 1.010, RSMo, to 
prohibit dram shop liability and to follow the 
common law rule that furnishing alcoholic bev-
erages is not the proximate cause of injuries in-
flicted by intoxicated persons. 
2. The legislature hereby declares that this 
section shall be interpreted so that the holdings 
in cases such as Carver v. Schafer, 647 S.W.2d 
570 (Mo.App.1983); Sampson v. W.F. Enter-
prises, Inc. 611 S.W. 2d 333 (Mo.App.1980); 
and Ncsbitt v. Westport Square, Ltd., 624 
S.W.2d 519 (Mo.App.1981) be abrogated in 
favor of prior judicial interpretation finding the 
consumption ot alcoholic beverages, rather than 
the furnishing of alcoholic beverages, to be the 
proximate cause of injuries inflicted upon an-
other by an intoxicated person. 
3. Notwithstanding subsections 1 and 2 of 
this section, a cause of action may be brought 
by or on behalf of any person who has suffered 
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personal injury or death against any person li-
censed to sell intoxicating liquor by the drink 
for consumption on the premises who, pursuant 
to section 311.310, RSMo, has been convicted, 
or has received a suspended imposition of the 
sentence arising from the conviction, of the sale 
of intoxicating liquor to a person under the age 
of twenty-one years or an obviously intoxicated 
person if the sale of such intoxicating liquor is 
the proximate cause of the personal injury or 
death sustained by such person. 
(L. 1985 S.B. 345 f 1) 
(1985) There is no common-law "dramshop" liability on the 
part of a social host who serves alcohol in his home to an 
intoxicated guest who later injures a third party. Harnman v. 
Smith (A.), 697 S.W.2d 219. 
537.060. Contribution between tort-feasors 
—release of one or more, effect.—Defendants in 
a judgment founded on an action for the redress 
of a private wrong shall be subject to contribu-
tion, and all other consequences of such judg-
ment, in the same manner and to the same ex-
tent as defendants in a judgment in an action 
founded on contract. When an agreement by re-
lease, covenant not to sue or not to enforce a 
judgment is given in good faith to one of two or 
more persons liable in tort for the same injury 
or wrongful death, such agreement shall not dis-
charge any of the other tort-feasors for the 
damage unless the terms of the agreement so 
provide; however such agreement shall reduce 
the claim by the stipulated amount of the agree-
ment, or in the amount of consideration paid, 
whichever is greater. The agreement shall dis-
charge the tort-feasor to whom it is given from 
all liability Yor contribution or noncontractual 
indemnity to any other tort-feasor. The term 
"noncontractual indemnity" as used in this sec-
tion refers to indemnity between joint tort-
feasors culpably negligent, having no legal rela-
tionship to each other and does not include in-
demnity which comes about by reason of con-
tract, or by reason of vicarious liability. 
(RSMo 1939 § 3658, A.L. 1983 H.B. 135 & 194) 
Prior revisions: 1929 | 3268; 1919 § 4223; 1909 § 5431 
(1974) When joint tort-feasors are each chargeable with ac-
tive or affirmative negligence, neither is entitled to indemnity 
from the other; however, one may be entitled to contribution 
from the other. Lewis v. Amchem Products, Inc. (A.), 510 
S.W.2d 46. 
537.065. Claimant and tort-feasor may con-
tract to limit recovery to specified assets or in-
surance contract—effect.—Any person having 
an unliquidated claim for damages against a 
tort-feasor, on account of bodily injuries or 
death, may enter into a contract with such tort-
feasor! or any insurer in his behalf or both, 
whereby, in consideration of the payment of a 
specified amount, the person asserting the claim 
agrees that in the event of a judgment against 
the tort-feasor, neither he nor any person, firm 
or corporation claiming by or through him will 
levy execution, by garnishment or as otherwise 
provided by law, except against the specific as-
sets listed in the contract and except against 
any insurer which insures the legal liability of 
the tort-feasor for such damage and which in-
surer is not excepted from execution, garnish-
ment or other legal procedure by such contract. 
Execution or garnishment proceedings in aid 
thereof shall lie only as to assets of the tort-fea-
sor specifically mentioned in the contract or the 
insurer or insurers not excluded in such con-
tract. Such contract, when properly acknowl-
edged by the parties thereto, may be recorded in 
the office of the recorder of deeds in any county 
where a judgment may be rendered, or in the 
county of the residence of the tort-feasor, or in 
both such counties, and if the same is so re-
corded then such tort-feasor's property, except 
as to the assets specifically listed in the contract, 
shall not be subject to any judgment lien as the 
result of any judgment rendered against the 
tort-feasor, arising out of the transaction for 
which the contract is entered into. 
(L. 1959 S.B. 259 § 1) 
(1974) This section does not deprive insuror of right to be 
heard on question of coverage or collusion and does not dis-
criminate against insurors. Butters v. City of Independence 
(Mo.), 513 S.W.2d 418. 
(1975) Guardian ad litem who sat silent during alleged im-
proper argument and who made an admission of liability held 
not to have violated his duty to ward and to have owed no 
duty to insuror after having proceeded under this section. 
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of 
Am. (Mo.), 522 S.W.2d 809. 
537.080. Action for wrongful death—who 
may sue—limitation.—Whenever the death of a 
person results from any act, conduct, occur-
rence, transaction, or circumstance which, if 
death had not ensued, would have entitled such 
person to recover damages in respect thereof, 
the person or party who, or the corporation 
which, would have been liable if death had not 
ensued shall be liable in an action for damages, 
notwithstanding the death of the person injured, 
which damages may be sued for 
(1) By the spouse or children, natural or 
adopted, legitimate or illegitimate, or by the fa-
ther or mother of the deceased, natural or adop-
tive; 
(2) If there be no persons in class (1) entitled 
to bring the action, then by the brother or sister 
of the deceased, or their descendants, who can 
establish his or her right to those damages set 
out in section 537.090 because of the death; 
(3) If there be no persons in class (1) or (2) 
entitled to bring the action, then by a plaintiff 
ad litem. Such plaintiff ad litem shall be ap-
pointed by the court having jurisdiction over the 
action for damages provided in this section upon 
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Where a restraint upon trade or 54 Am. Jur. 2d, Monopolies, Restraints of 
monopolization is result of valid Trade & Unfair Trade Practices, §§ 623-640. 
governmental action, as opposed to private VI?MTTIT 
action, no violation of this section can be made *"• V E N U E . 
out. Twine v Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 294 Ala. Collateral references. •— 54 Am. Jur. 2d, 
43, 311 So. 2d 299 (1975). Monopolies, Restraints of Trade & Unfair Trade 
Collateral references. — 58 C.J.S., Practices, § 634. 
Monopolies, §§ 95-104. 
ARTICLE 6. 
ILLEGAL LIQUOR SALES. 
§ 6-5-70. Furnishing liquor to minors. 
Either parent of a minor, guardian or a person standing in loco parentis to 
the minor having neither father nor mother shall have a right of action against 
any person who unlawfully sells or furnishes spirituous liquors to such minor 
and may recover such damages as the jury may assess, provided the person 
selling or furnishing liquor to the minor had knowledge of or was chargeable 
with notice or knowledge of such minority. Only one action may be commenced 
for each offense under this section. (Code 1907, § 2467; Code 1923, § 5673; Code 
1940, T. 7, § 120.) 
Cross reference. — As to prohibition against 45 Am. Jur. 2d, Intoxicating Liquors, §§ 
selling, giving, etc., alcoholic beverages to 553-556, 561-614. 
minors, see § 28-3-260. 
Collateral references. — 48 C.J.S., 
Intoxicating Liquors, § 290. 
§ 6-5-71. Right of action of wife, child, parent or other person for injury in 
consequence of illegal sale or disposition of liquor or beverages. 
(a) Every wife, child, parent or other person who shall be injured in person, 
property or means of support by any intoxicated person or in consequence of 
the intoxication of any person shall have a right of action against any person 
who shall, by selling, giving or otherwise disposing of to another, contrary to 
the provisions of law, any liquors or beverages; cause the intoxication of such 
person for all damages actually sustained, as well as exemplary damages. 
(b) Upon the death of any party, the action or right of action will survive to 
or against his executor or administrator, 
(c) The party injured, or his legal representative, may commence a joint or 
separate action against the person intoxicated or the person who furnished the 
liquor, and all such claims shall be by civil action in any court having jurisdiction 
thereof. (Acts 1909, No. 191, p. 63; Code 1923, §§ 5674, 5675; Code 1940, T. 7, 
§§ 121, 122.) 
I. General Consideration. 
II. Right of Action. 
III. Survival of Action. 
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION. Shirley, 261 Ala. 100, 73 So. 2d 77 (1954); 
Cited in Draughon's Bus. College v. Battles, Campbell v. Davis, 274 Ala. 555, 150 So. 2d 187 
37 Ala. App. 24, 68 So. 2d 58 (1952); Shirley v. (1962). 
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II. RIGHT OF ACTION. 
Section evidences policy to discourage 
illegal sale of alcoholic beverages. Phillips v. 
Derrick, 36 Ala. App. 244, 54 So. 2d 320 (1951). 
Section does not give cause of action for 
wrongful death. — Damages recoverable are 
expressly declared to be those actually sustained 
by injury to person or property. Thus where 
plaintiffs decedent was killed in automobile 
collision with defendant's decedent, who was 
allegedly intoxicated, the plaintiff had no cause 
of action under this section. Webb v. French, 228 
Ala. 43, 152 So. 215 (1934). 
Complaint in action for sale to minor. — In 
an action under this section it was not necessary 
for the plaintiff to aver that the defendants were 
licensees where the complaint showed that the 
person to whom the beverage was sold was a 
minor, for such a sale is in contravention of law 
by whomsoever made. Phillips v. Derrick, 36 Ala. 
App. 244, 54 So. 2d 320 (1951). 
Proof of causal connection between sale and 
injury not required. — By the terms of this 
section the person injured by the illegal sale of 
alcoholic beverages is not held to the usual 
standards of proof of causal connection between 
the illegal sale of the beverages and the injury. 
Phillips v. Derrick, 36 Ala. App. 244, 54 So. 2d 
320 (1951). 
- Evidence making out prima facie case. — 
Under this section a plaintiff made out a prima 
facie case when he introduced evidence tending 
to show injury to property by intoxicated person 
who has been furnished alcoholic beverages by 
the defendant in violation of law. Phillips v. 
Derrick, 36 Ala. App. 244, 54 So. 2d 320 (1951). 
Collateral references. — 48 CJ.S., 
Intoxicating Liquors, §§ 430-485. 
45 Am. Jur. 2d, Intoxicating Liquors, §§ 
553-556, 561-614. 
Federal constitutional and legislative 
provisions as to intoxicating liquors as affecting 
state statutes imposing liability for damages on 
seller. 70 ALR 140. 
Liability of saloon keeper for injury to patron 
by other persons. 106 ALR 1003. 
Common-law right of action for personal 
injury or death of third person resulting from act 
of intoxicated consumer of liquor. 130 ALR 366. 
Liability of lessor or his property for damages 
resulting from lessee's sale of intoxicating 
liquor. 169 ALR 1203. 
What constitutes "injury in person or 
property" within civil damage or dramshop act 
6 ALR2d 798. 
Civil liability for suicide resulting from use of 
intoxicating liquor. 23 ALR 1276,11 ALR2d 765. 
Extraterritorial effect of civil damage or 
dramshop act. 22 ALR2d 1128. 
What constitutes "intoxicating liquor" within 
civil damage act. 52 ALR2d 890. 
Wife's right of action at common law for loss 
of consortion as result of furnishing drugs or 
liquor to husband. 73 ALR2d 1384. 
Husband's right of action at common law for 
loss of wife's services sustained by husband in 
consequence of sale or gift of intoxicating liquor 
to wife. 75 ALR2d 834, 838. 
III. SURVIVAL OF ACTION. 
Section confined to personal injury not 
causing death. — This section may be given full 
effect by confining it to causes of action 
accruing for personal injury not causing death, 
wherein the living has a just demand against the 
living for actual damages sustained by tortious 
act In such case this section seems to keep alive 
such demand in favor of the estate of the one 
against the estate of the other. Webb v. French, 
228 Ala. 43, 152 So. 215 (1934). 
Collateral references. — 25A CJ.S., Death, 
§§ 39-42. 
ARTICLE 7. 
ACTIONS AGAINST ESTATE FOR 
TRESPASS, WASTE, ETC. 
§ 6-5-90. Right of action against executor or administrator. 
Any person or his personal representatives may commence an action against 
the executor or administrator of any testator or intestate who in his lifetime has 
wasted, destroyed, taken, carried away or converted to his own use the goods 
or chattels of any such person or committed any trespass on the real estate of 
such person. (Code 1923, § 5710; Code 1940, T. 7, § 137.) 
Cross reference. — As to criminal trespass, 
see § 13-2-100 et seq. 
There is distinction between "actions" and 
"causes of action." An "action" is a proceeding 
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ARTICLE 6. 
ILLEGAL LIQUOR SALES. 
6-5-70. Furnishing liquor to minors. 
Legislative intent. — Considering the tone 
f the times in which this section was enacted, 
nd considering this section on its face, this 
action is a temperance or prohibition provi-
ion, intended to deter the sale of "spirituous 
iquors" to minors, to deter the intoxication of 
he minor that would result from such a sale, 
nd to provide a remedy for the aggrieved 
arties that this section describes. Espey v. 
lonvenience Marketers, Inc., 578 So. 2d 1221 
(Via. 1991). 
The words "furnishes" and "furnishing" 
xtend liability under this section to a seller or 
irnisher of spirituous liquors, who, from the 
Dtality of the circumstances, must reasonably 
lfer that the person to whom the spirituous 
quor is sold or furnished will permit a minor 
) consume some of the spirituous liquor, 
aymon v. Braddock, 544 So. 2d 900 (Ala. 
989). 
"Layman's" totality of the circumstances 
ast is specifically related to the terms "fur-
ishes" and "furnishing" in § 6-5-70; this test 
as yet to be applied to Dram Shop actions 
nder § 6-5-71. Espey v. Convenience Mar-
eters, Inc., 578 So. 2d 1221 (Ala. 1991). 
Section 28-3-l(15),s definition of "liquor" 
i not determinative of the definition of the 
arm "spirituous liquors" in this section. Espey 
. Convenience Marketers, Inc., 578 So. 2d 
221 (Ala. 1991). 
For the purposes of this section the term 
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION. 
"Other person." — The classof potential 
laintiifs designated as "other person" includes 
nyone who is proximately injured in person, 
roperty or means of support by any intoxi-
ited person or in consequence of the intoxica-
on of any person. This category of plaintiffs is 
s broad as proof of proximate cause will 
ermit. Ward v. Rhodes, Hammonds & Beck, 
ic, 511 So. 2d 159 (Ala. 1987). 
i*Contrary to the provisions of law" con-
trued. — Store's selling of beer to one party, 
ho then gave it to a third party, was not a 
isposition of the beer to the third party by the 
.ore that was "contrary to the provisions of 
"spirituous liquors" includes beer; thus, 
father's claim under this section against store 
which sold beer to his son who was subse-
quently killed in alcohol-related crash could 
proceed. Espey v. Convenience Marketers, Inc., 
578 So. 2d 1221 (Ala. 1991). 
Right of action created in minor's par-
e n t — This section creates a right of action in 
a parent of a minor against any person who 
unlawfully sells or furnishes spirituous liquors 
to such minor, not to the parent of another 
minor. Parker v. Miller Brewing Co., 560 So. 
2d 1030 (Ala. 1990). 
Minor has no right of action under this 
section. Maples v. Chinese Palace, Inc., 389 
So. 2d 120 (Ala. 1980). 
The trial court did not err in directing 
the verdict for seller of alcoholic bever-
ages since there was no evidence, or reason-
able inference that could have been drawn 
from the evidence, to indicate that minor 
consumed any of the wine coolers purchased 
during the visit to the store. Laymon v. 
Braddock, 544 So. 2d 900 (Ala. 1989). 
Collateral references. 
What constitutes violation of an act prohibit-
ing sale of intoxicating liquor to a minor. 89 
ALR3d 1256. 
Social host's liability for injuries incurred by 
third parties as a result of intoxicated guest's 
negligence. 62 ALR4th 16. 
law" in claim based on third party's intoxica-
tion under this section. Espey v. Convenience 
Marketers, Inc., 578 So. 2d 1221 (Ala. 1991). 
"Layman's" totality of the circumstances 
test is specifically related to the terms "fur-
nishes" and "furnishing" in § 6-5-70; this test 
has yet to be applied to Dram Shop actions 
under this section. Espey v. Convenience Mar-
keters, Inc., 578 So. 2d 1221 (Ala. 1991). 
No direct common law action. — Lounge 
patron who was injured by another, intoxicated 
lounge patron did not have a direct common 
law cause of action against the lounge. Ward v. 
Rhodes, Hammonds & Beck, Inc., 511 So. 2d 
159 (Ala. 1987). 
6-5-71. Right of action of wife, child, parent or other person for 
injury in consequence of illegal sale or disposition of 
liquor or beverages. 
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— Act is not limited to involuntary intoxi-
Nation. — T n e Alabama Dram Shop Act is 
•clear and it makes no distinction between 
Voluntary and involuntary consumption of al-
£ohol; if the act were limited to involuntary 
•intoxication, then the act would have virtually 
n 0 application; if the legislature had intended 
for the act to apply only in cases of involuntary 
intoxication, it could have so stated. Jaitfes v. 
3rewton Motel Mgt, Inc., 570 So. 2d 1225 (Ala. 
1990). 
•Voluntary intoxication of deceased was 
not a defense to an action brought by the 
deceased's minor children under the Pram 
Shop Act. James v. Brewton Motel Mgt, Inc., 
570 So. 2d 1225 (Ala. 1990); James v. Najor, 
575 So. 2d 1105 (Ala. 1991). 
Absence of visible intoxication of car 
driver and passenger while in defendant's bar 
was ground for summary judgment ii* bar 
daughter severely injured in automobile acci-
dent with the two bar patrons. Liao v. Harry's 
Bar, 574 So. 2d 775 (Ala. 1990). 
Award of actual damages not required. 
— In a dram shop action, when there is 
sufficient evidence of actual damage or injury 
to support an award of compensatory daniages, 
the law does not require a specific aw^rd of 
actual damages in order to support an award of 
punitive damages. Booth, Inc. v. Miles, 567 So. 
2d 1206 (Ala. 1990). 
Cited in Gregory v. Western World InB. Co., 
481 So. 2d 878 (Ala. 1985); Messick v. Moring, 
514 So. 2d 892 (Ala. 1987); Odom ex rel. Odom 
v. Blackburn, 559 So. 2d 1080 (Ala. 1990). 
Collateral references. 
Validity, construction, and effect of statute 
limiting amount recoverable in dram shop 
action. 78 ALR4th 542. 
II. RIGHT OF ACTION. 
This section creates a civil reniedy 
against persons who, contrary to law, cause the 
intoxication of another by providing the other 
person with alcoholic beverages, when the 
plaintiff is injured because of the intoxication. 
Martin v. Watts, 513 So. 2d 958 (Ala. 1987). 
Persons injured by intoxicated minors who 
were supplied with alcoholic beverages by a 
noncommercial supplier have a right of action 
Vagainst such supplier. Martin v. Watts, 513 So. 
2d 958 (Ala. 1987). 
Term which most narrowly limits cause 
of action is requirement that providing of 
alcoholic beverages be contrary to law. 
Smoyer v. Birmingham Area Chamber of Com-
merce, 517 So. 2d 585 (Ala. 1987). 
Alabama's dram shop statute creates a 
civil action against a purveyor of alcoholic 
beverages in favor of any person, or the 
personal representative of any person, injured 
or killed by an intoxicated person when the 
beverages causing the intoxication were dis-
pensed contrary to the provisions of law. Bu-
chanan v. Merger Enters., Inc., 463 So. 2d 121 
(Ala. 1984). 
Legislatively created principles of dram shop 
liability, not fully implemented by the, acts 
themselves, can be effectuated by a common 
law negligence action. Under the common law 
doctrine of respondeat superior, a principal is 
liable for the negligence of his agents commit-
ted within the scope of their employment. 
Thus, the summary judgment granted by the 
trial court in favor of a licensee, on grounds 
that the alcoholic beverages were sold by his 
employee rather than the licensee himself, was 
reversed. Putman v. Cromwell, 475 So. 2d 524 
(Ala. 1985). 
The words, "every wife, child, parent" 
denote Te\a1aonsnip Yo peTson \o wnom 
intoxicating liquors were sold. Maples v. 
Chinese Palace, Inc., 389 So. 2d 120 (Ala. 
1980). 
No liability for selling to minor who then 
gives to second minor. — Selling alcohol to 
one minor, who then gives part of the alcohol to 
a second minor, is not furnishing alcohol to the 
second minor creating liability under this 
section. Parker v. Miller Brewing Co., 560 So. 
2d 1030 (Ala. 1990). 
Actions brought by minor children. — 
Minor children of one who is killed because of 
his own intoxication are protected parties, and 
thus, have a cause of action against the seller 
of the intoxicating beverage under the Ala-
bama Dram Shop Act. James v. Brewton Motel 
Mgt., Inc., 570 So. 2d 1225 (Ala. 1990). 
Minors, who appealed through their grand-
mother and mother respectively, for damages 
for the death of their father, were parties 
protected by this section, and therefore, were 
entitled to sue under the statute. James v. 
Najor, 575 So. 2d 1105 (Ala. 1991). 
Where father was killed because of his own 
intoxication and where father's minor children 
Drought an action under this section, minor 
children were not attempting to bring a wrong-
ful death action in the guise of an action under 
this section; they clearly alleged damages for 
loss of support allowed by the act. James v. 
Brewton Motel Mgt., Inc., 570 So. 2d 1225 (Ala. 
1990). 
Intoxicated person's wife was a pro-
tected party under the act and was entitled to 
bring an action against liquor supplier. Weeks 
v. Princeton's, 570 So. 2d 1232 (Ala. 1990). 
The intoxicated person is not a protected 
party under the act Weeks v. Princeton's, 
570 So. 2d 1232 (Ala. 1990). 
No violation of law if social 
59 
§ 6-5-71 CIVIL PRACTICE § 6-5-71 
host/nonlicensee serves 19-year-old. — 
There is not any constitutional provision or 
any statute that makes it a criminal offense for 
a nonlicensee/social host to furnish alcoholic 
beverages to a person 19 years of age; thus, 
even if reception hosts had provided cham-
pagne to 19-year-old owner of car that injured 
plaintiffs daughter, summary judgment in 
their favor would still have been proper be-
cause there would have been no violation of 
law. Furthermore, since furnishing alcohol to 
19-year-old is not illegal, summary judgment 
was proper for the actual champagne supplier, 
the groom. Liao v. Harry's Bar, 574 So. 2d 775 
(Ala. 1990). 
Wedding reception hosts not liable for 
injuries where guest of honor provided 
alcohol. — One of the essential elements of a 
cause of action under this section is that the 
defendant provided alcoholic beverages to the 
intoxicated person who caused the injury; thus, 
where undisputed evidence showed that the 
groom, not the hosts, provided the champagne 
for the reception, summary judgment in host's 
favor was proper. Liao v. Harry's Bar, 574 So. 
2d 775 (Ala. 1990). 
Host not liable for injuries where guests 
not charged to attend or for drinks. — 
Where defendant was host of a party where 
none of the guests was charged to attend or to 
drink the alcoholic beverages provided, an 
action for common-law negligence would not 
lie against defendant where automobile acci-
dent, in which the intoxicated guest was in-
volved, ensued. Beeson v. Scoles Cadillac 
Corp., 506 So. 2d 999 (Ala. 1987). 
As to a right of action, the party intoxi-
cated is excluded. — The persons enumer-
ated are persons who stand to him in special 
relations, and it is therefore to be assumed that 
'any other person" who may sue must also 
stand to him in some special relation so as to 
)e injured by his intoxication or by the sale, 
jtc., to him. Maples v. Chinese Palace, Inc., 
{89 So. 2d 120 (Ala. 1980). 
Summary judgment proper for defen-
lant where plaintiff injured by negligent 
Iriving of volunteer waiter who was served 
ree drinks at a chamber of commerce function. 
mover v. Birmingham Area Chamber of Com-
lerce, 517 So. 2d 585 (Ala. 1987). 
Where defendant's only connection to the 
tiamber of commerce function where liquor 
as served was that he rented a reception 
>om to the chamber of commerce, summary 
idgment was properly granted since in order 
r the Dram Shop Act to apply, a person must 
ave provided alcoholic beverages to another. 
Tioyer v. Birmingham Area Chamber of Com-
erce, 517 So. 2d 585 (Ala. 1987). 
Qwner of cabin where minors became 
intoxicated held not subject to suit — 
Where minors became intoxicated at a cabin 
party hosted by a service club and an individ-
ual sponsor, an action under this section would 
lie against the club and the sponsor but not 
against the cabin owner, whose only connec-
tion to the party was his ownership interest in 
the cabin and his presence during the party. 
Martin v. Watts, 513 So. 2d 958 (Ala. 1987). 
A limited partnership which hosted a party 
given at a country club where country club 
employees allegedly continued serving alco-
holic beverages to a visibly intoxicated guest 
whose intoxication allegedly caused an auto-
mobile accident in which plaintiffs decedent 
was killed, could not be held liable as the 
alcoholic beverage control board's regulation 
applies only to licensees and the partnership 
was not a licensee, and there was nothing else 
tending to show that the partnership dispensed 
alcoholic beverages. Lackey v. HealthAmerica 
Ala., 514 So. 2d 883 (Ala. 1987). 
Where the record revealed no evidence 
that defendant lounge provided driver in-
volved in automobile accident with any 
alcoholic beverages on the day in question, 
the trial court was correct in granting defen-
dant lounge's motion for a directed verdict, 
since one of the elements of a cause of action 
under the Dram Shop Act is that the defendant 
provide alcoholic beverages to the intoxicated 
person who caused the accident. Nelson v. 
Dunaway, 536 So. 2d 955 (Ala. Civ. App. 1988). 
Cited in DeLoach v. Mayer Elec. Supply Co., 
378 So. 2d 733 (Ala. 1979). 
Collateral references. 
Recovery under Civil Damage (Dram Shop) 
Act for intangibles such as mental anguish, 
embarrassment, loss of affection or companion-
ship, or the like. 78 ALR3d 1199. 
Liability of persons furnishing intoxicating 
liquor for injury to or death of consumer, 
outside coverage of civil damage acts. 98 
ALR3d 1230. 
Choice of law as to liability of liquor seller 
for injuries caused by intoxicated person. 2 
ALR4th 952. 
Failure to restrain drunk driver as ground 
for liability of state or local government unit or 
officer. 48 ALR4th 320. 
Social host's liability for injuries incurred by 
third parties as a result of intoxicated guest's 
negligence. 62 ALR4th 16. 
Alcohol-related vehicular homicide: Nature 
and elements of offense. 64 ALR4th 166. 
Passenger's liability to vehicular accident 
victim for harm caused by intoxicated motoi 
vehicle driver. 64 ALR4th 272. 
Driving while intoxicated: "choice of evils' 
defense that driving was necessary to protect 
life or property. 64 ALR4th 298. 
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ARTICLE 8. 
FRAUD, MISREPRESENTATION AND DECEIT. 
The elements of the tort of bad faith may 
be proved, as with other intentional torts, by 
circumstantial as well as direct evidence. Re-
coverable damages may include mental dis-
tress and economic loss. Chavers v. National 
Security Fire & Cas. Co, 405 So. 2d 1 (Ala. 
1981). 
Tort of outrage. — The law to be applied in 
a case involving the tort of outrage has been 
clearly stated: the behavior of a defendant 
must be so outrageous in character, and so 
extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible 
bounds of decency, and to be regarded as 
atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized 
community. Barrett v. Farmers & Merchants 
Bank, 451 So. 2d 257 (Ala. 1984). 
Cited in Treadwell Ford, Inc. v. Lewis, 416 
So. 2d 410 (Ala. 1982); Army Aviation Center 
Fed. Credit Union v. Poston, 460 So. 2d 139 
(Ala. 1984). 
§ 6-5-100. Fraud — Right of action generally. 
The critical elements of an action for 
fraud are: (a) A false representation usually 
concerning an existing material fact; (b) repre-
sentation which (1) the defendant knew was 
false when made, or (2) was made recklessly 
and without regard to its truth or falsity, or (3) 
was made by telling plaintiff that defendant 
had knowledge that the representation was 
true while not having such knowledge; (c) 
reliance by the plaintiff on the representation 
and that he was deceived by it; (d) reliance 
which was justified under the circumstances; 
and (e) damage to the plaintiff proximately 
resulting from his reliance. Army Aviation 
Center Fed. Credit Union v. Poston, 460 So. 2d 
139 (Ala. 1984); Patel v. Hanna, 525 So. 2d 
1359 (Ala. 1988). 
Reliance and damages are elements of 
fraud action. — Plaintiff complaint that al-
leged bank official and her former husband 
misrepresented that her note was secured by 
her car and that bank could repossess car for 
failure to make payments would not allow her 
to recover since she was obligated to make 
payments pursuant to her divorce decree and 
she quit making payments. Reliance and dam-
ages are elements of a fraud action and were 
not present under these facts. Timmons v. 
Central Bank, 528 So. 2d 845 (Ala. 1988). 
Essential to a claim of fraud under Ala-
bama law is a material misrepresentation 
of fact which has led another to act to his 
detnment. United States v. Burgreen, 591 F.2d 
291 (5th Cir. 1979). 
1
 To constitute fraud, there must be some 
misrepresentation of material fact to a party 
who relies upon such misrepresentation to his 
detnment. Parker v. Thyssen Mining Constr., 
Inc., 428 So. 2d 615 (Ala. 1983). 
To be actionable fraud, a statement must 
misrepresent a material fact and the defrauded 
party must act upon it to his damage. Ameri-
can Pioneer Life Ins. Co. v Sherrard, 477 So. 
2d 287 (Ala. 1985). 
Intent to defraud not essential under 
section. 
In accord with first paragraph in the bound 
volume. See Burlington N R.R. v. Warren, 574 
So. 2d 758 (Ala. 1990). 
Contract actions alleging misrepre-
sentation ordinarily sound in tort. — Ordi-
narily, actions to rescind a contract, alleging 
misrepresentation of matenal facts relied upon 
to the plaintiff 's detnment, are statutorily 
grounded actions in tort. Spanish Fort Mobile 
Homes, Inc. v. Sebnte Corp., 369 So. 2d 777 
(Ala. 1979). 
Reliance must be reasonable. — In order 
to recover for fraud, a plaintiffs reliance on 
false statements must be reasonable. Newman 
v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 So. 2d 106 (Ala. 1986). 
Mere puffery will not support a claim of 
fraud. American Pioneer Life Ins. Co. v. 
Sherrard, 477 So. 2d 287 (Ala. 1985). 
Overt act by conspirator in furtherance 
of the conspiracy is not essential element 
of fraud. — That a particular conspirator 
commit an overt act in furtherance of the 
conspiracy is not an essential element of the 
fraud claim. Huckleberry v. M.C. Dixon Lum-
ber Co., 503 So. 2d 1209 (Ala. 1987). 
A representation regarding acts or 
events to take place in the future consti-
tutes fraud only if, at the time of making the 
statement, the party intends to deceive and not 
to perform the acts promised. Amencan Pio-
neer Life Ins. Co. v. Sherrard, 477 So. 2d 287 
(Ala. 1985). 
Sufficiency of complaint 
Where the plaintiffs' complaint alleged that 
the defendants knowingly made exaggerated 
projections of the earning capacity of a pizza 
franchise upon which the plaintiffs relied in 
purchasing the franchise, the complaint stated 
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